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1  Executive Summary 
 
DataONE (Data Observation Network for Earth, http://www.dataone.org/) is a federated 
data network built to improve access to Earth science data, and to support science by: (1) 
engaging the relevant science, data, and policy communities; (2) facilitating easy, secure, 
and persistent storage of data; and (3) disseminating integrated and user-friendly tools for 
data discovery, analysis, visualization, and decision-making.  
 
DataONE has invested significant effort into the development of an identity management 
(IdM) system that supports federated identities from a wide variety of identity providers 
and includes mechanisms and procedures to support access management.  
 
The Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC) conducted a design-level 
review of the DataONE IdM system implementation. This document represents the findings 
and recommendations from the review, which are in summary as follows: 
 
 Documentation Issues 
o Missing and Out-of-Date Documentation 
o Missing Policies and Expectations 
o CILogon Extension Not Documented 
o Definition of “Verified User” Lacking 
 Architectural Issues 
o Bindings of DataONE User Identities 
o Lack of Qualifier for Local User Identities 
o Supporting International Users 
o Managing Groups 
o Browser Authentication for Member Nodes 
 Operational issues 
o Incident Response Plan 
o Backup of IdM Data 
o Logging 
o Intrusion Detection 
o Contacting Users 
o Dependency on CILogon 
 Recommendations 
o Short-Term Recommended Tasks 
o Medium-Term Recommended Tasks 
o Longer-Term Recommended Tasks 
o Issues to be Tracked 
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2  Overview of DataONE 
 
DataONE (Data Observation Network for Earth, http://www.dataone.org/) is a federated 
data network built to improve access to Earth science data, and to support science by: (1) 
engaging the relevant science, data, and policy communities; (2) facilitating easy, secure, 
and persistent storage of data; and (3) disseminating integrated and user-friendly tools for 
data discovery, analysis, visualization, and decision-making. 
 
 
There are three major components in the DataONE infrastructure: Member Nodes which 
represent data repositories, Coordinating Nodes which serve data management and 
discovery services, and the Investigator Toolkit which contains a variety of end user tools 
for interacting with the infrastructure.  For the purpose of the CTSC review, focus was put 
only on the Member and Coordinating Nodes since these items participate in the Identity 
Management System (IdM). 
Participation in the DataONE infrastructure as a Member Node (i.e., implementing or 
utilizing DataONE service interfaces) provides several fundamental services upon which 
additional infrastructure, services, applications and communities may be built. These core 
community building services include: 
 promotion of data preservation through automated replication of data and metadata 
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 support for arbitrary globally unique identifiers with guaranteed resolution and 
dereferencing 
 extensible search and discovery services 
 federated management of user identities and access control 
Member Nodes primarily are existing data repositories (e.g., Dryad1, the Knowledge 
Network for Biodiversity2, ORNL DAAC3) that already fill an important role in their 
respective communities supporting data management, curation, discovery, and access 
functions. Existing or new repositories can participate in the DataONE infrastructure by 
implementing a simple set of APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) which represent a 
convergence of functionality expressed in a variety of existing systems. These APIs include 
basic operations such as listing and retrieving objects, support for creation of content, and 
the ability to generate low level system metadata describing the various objects (data, 
metadata) exposed by the service. Member Nodes may implement a subset of the full suite 
of Member Node APIs4, and in this way participate in the network with minimal effort (e.g., 
as a “read only” data source). Member Nodes that implement the full suite of APIs will be 
able to accept data from other Member Nodes which assists with data preservation by 
ensuring multiple copies of all content are available, thus reducing the risk that content will 
be lost or inaccessible if a Member Node should go offline. 
Member Nodes may eventually number in the thousands as progressively smaller 
repositories come online, perhaps even to the level of individual labs deploying their own 
Member Node to take advantage of the broad infrastructure enabled by DataONE. 
Coordinating Nodes implement critical services through the APIs5 that enable identifier 
resolution, data preservation, data discovery, and supplement the federated identity 
system. Coordinating Nodes replicate all content between themselves, and in doing so 
create a small set (3-6 Nodes) of geographically and institutionally distributed systems that 
ensure ongoing operation of the infrastructure should any particular node be inaccessible. 
Coordinating Nodes maintain complete copies of all science metadata (detailed 
descriptions of science data objects and collections) and system metadata (low level 
metadata describing the type, size, ownership, and locations of data) and index this 
information to enable data discovery services. 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 http://datadryad.org/ 
2
 http://knb.ecoinformatics.org/index.jsp 
3
 http://daac.ornl.gov/ 
4
 http://mule1.dataone.org/ArchitectureDocs-current/apis/MN_APIs.html 
5
 http://mule1.dataone.org/ArchitectureDocs-current/apis/CN_APIs.html 
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3  DataONE Identity Management System 
 
The goals of the DataONE identity management (IdM) system are: 
 Stay out of the credentialing business and not weaken authentication provided by 
identity providers. 
 Maintain the autonomy of the Member Nodes (MNs), including those with legacy 
systems. 
 Allow the Coordinating Nodes (CNs) to service searches in a way that predicts 
access control implemented by MNs. 
 Give users control of equivalency of their identities. 
 Allow MNs to control equivalency of their locally-managed identity and other user 
identities. 
 Control access to restricted (non-public/moderate sensitivity) data. 
 Support both web and command-line clients. 
 Be sustainable for a century. 
 
Identity Management for DataONE addresses the need to identify users that request the use 
of services and/or data/metadata resources within the DataONE virtual organization. 
DataONE recognizes that not all services/resources require user identification; thus, 
support for anonymous access to certain services/resources is possible using a Public 
identity. DataONE provides services for users to register their identity with DataONE in a 
user account so as to create a unique DataONE identifier, along with other attributes about 
that user. This account information may be used for authorization and logging of DataONE 
transactions. 
 
Users may have multiple identities as a result of distributed research endeavors at different 
participating organizations and/or changes in organizational affiliation. Because of this, the 
DataONE Identity Management service will support user identity mappings, which allows 
users to authenticate using any one of their multiple identities, but still be recognized as 
the same DataONE identity. When a DataONE authenticated session begins, information 
pertaining to the user’s identity is available for authorization purposes, which includes a 
listing of all mapped identities associated with that user. In general, these mapped 
identities serve equally well for authorization decisions—that is, within DataONE access 
control policies, reference to any mapped identity is the same as using any other of the 
user’s identities. However, it is possible that some MNs will authorize some operations 
based only on the user’s primary/active identity. 
 
In addition, the Identity Management service provides a system for users and 
administrators to create, store, and modify groups of users that can be used in access 
control directives. Only the user creating a group will be allowed to delete the group or 
change the group’s membership. 
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4  CTSC Findings 
The results of the CTSC review are broken up into two parts: Strengths and Issues. 
 
4.1 Strengths 
The overall assessment of the DataONE (IdM) system was positive.  There are many 
strengths in the current DataONE IdM design, including support for authentication using 
federated identities, equivalence mapping of multiple identities for the same person, and a 
well-specified access policy language. The IdM system design is a good match for the 
system goals (specified above). 
Of particular note were the system’s operational strengths.  There are many good 
safeguards and security practices in place: 
 All administrator access uses a separate LDAP service. 
 Strong sudo practices are being used. 
 Security updates are being applied. 
 There is multi-master mirroring of Coordinating Nodes and LDAP. 
 All web access is done via HTTPS. 
 Good change control practices are in place. 
 Strong testing is done before rollout of updates. 
 Procedures are clearly defined for how the system will update. 
 Use of syslog. 
 Good controls over DataONE CA root keys. 
 Physical access to servers is limited and controlled. 
 Disaster recovery plan in place and being followed. 
 Server certificates issued by offline DataONE CAs are delivered securely (by SCP). 
4.2  Issues 
The IdM system issues have been organized into three broad categories: Documentation, 
Architectural, and Operational. 
The Documentation section delineates issues found in the current documentation, policies 
and procedures.  The Architectural section addresses issues found in the design and overall 
architecture of the DataONE IdM system.  Finally, the Operational section addresses 
perceived weaknesses in the operational security of the DataONE IdM system. 
4.2.1  Documentation Issues 
 
4.2.1.1  Missing and Out-of-Date Documentation 
Overall, DataONE’s IdM documentation is well done and in good order.  However, during 
the review, it was noted that there were some issues with the documentation.  There are 
several documentation areas marked with “TODO”.  Also, some of the documentation no 
longer reflects the current functioning or design of the system. 
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4.2.1.2  Missing Policies and Expectations 
The relationship between the Coordinating Nodes, Member Nodes and the DataONE user 
community involves trust and expectations that is presently implied. The following policies 
stand out as absent: 
 
 An acceptable use policy (AUP) that DataONE users agree to abide by. Some example 
AUPs that DataONE may want to consider in drafting their AUP include: 
o Open Science Grid: http://osg-docdb.opensciencegrid.org/cgi-
bin/ShowDocument?docid=86 
o XSEDE: https://www.xsede.org/usage-policies 
o iPlant: http://www.iplantcollaborative.org/node/1934 
 A privacy policy which states how DataONE will and will not collect, use and share 
data regarding its users. 
 A set of expectations stating how CNs and MNs behave with regard to IdM.  
4.2.1.3  CILogon Extension Not Documented 
One of the key interfaces in the system is the XML that is added to the CILogon 
certificate.  This XML expresses the identities and privileges of the users and is intended to 
be consumed by CNs and MNs. The reviewers did not find a schema or definition for this 
structure in the current documentation. Currently, DataONE has written all the software 
that parses this extension, but if an MN needs to write software that does so, they will need 
documentation on its syntax and semantics. 
 
4.2.1.4  Definition of Verified User Lacking 
The term “verified user” is found in the documentation but there is no definition of what 
this term really means.  There does not seem to be an explanation of how one really 
becomes verified and who performs the verification. 
 
4.2.2  Architectural Issues 
 
4.2.2.1  Bindings on DataONE User Identities 
DataONE supports binding of user identities (i.e., marking two user identities as 
equivalent) to support users with multiple identities. Use cases for identity binding include: 
1) users wanting to use different identity providers (e.g., Google, InCommon) at different 
times, 2) users migrating from one identity provider to another (i.e., changing university 
affiliation), 3) user name changes, 4) users losing access to a previously used identity (e.g., 
lost password, identity provider out-of-business). 
 
The CTSC reviewers note two concerns with the current identity binding design. First, 
DataONE does not bind external user identities (e.g., CILogon distinguished names) to 
DataONE-internal identities, but rather uses external user identities directly. This can 
potentially increase the disruption caused by changes in external identity providers. 
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However, the CTSC reviewers acknowledge that using external user identities directly 
simplifies the internal DataONE system design and implementation. Second, bindings 
between user IDs (i.e., one user with multiple IDs) are pairwise and not transitive in 
DataONE. To use a new identity in DataONE without losing existing authorizations and 
group memberships, the user must bind that new identity explicitly to each identity the 
user has previously registered with DataONE. As user identities change over time, this 
binding process will become increasingly cumbersome, particularly when users no longer 
have access to old identity providers to establish bindings to old identities. However, 
making identity bindings transitive increases risks, as the compromise of any identity 
would spread transitively to all bound identities for that user. Different user identities may 
have different privileges, and DataONE MNs can decide locally whether to trust identity 
bindings. In conclusion, the CTSC reviewers acknowledge the design trade-offs in the 
DataONE identity binding design and recommend that DataONE re-evaluate these trade-
offs as more operational experience is gained. 
4.2.2.2  Lack of Qualifier for Local User Identities 
The DataONE IdM system does not qualify local MN identities with an indication of their 
origin (i.e., to make the identities globally unique). This could lead to inappropriate 
authorization for replicated data if two users were to have the same identity at two 
different MN sites, i.e., it is unclear if jsmith at MN1 is the same person as jsmith at MN2. 
This issue becomes critical as data is replicated across MNs with local MN identities in 
authorization policies. 
4.2.2.3  Supporting International Users 
As the DataONE project moves forward, it plans to expand both its user base and Member 
Nodes to include international partners. This will bring challenges of international identity 
federation and require adjusting to international privacy expectations/laws (e.g., in the 
European Union). CILogon supports international users using OpenIDs (i.e., Google IDs) but 
does not otherwise support identity providers outside InCommon. DataONE needs a plan 
for supporting identity providers outside the US. 
For international support of SAML web single sign-on, CTSC’s recent work with LIGO to 
explore options for international identity federation (https://dcc.ligo.org/LIGO-
G1300768/public) can be a useful reference for DataONE. In summary, CTSC and LIGO 
found that international interfederation among research and education identity federations 
(for example, InCommon in the US) is a work in progress. InCommon is currently 
considering joining eduGAIN (http://edugain.org/), which interconnects identity 
federations around the world. Until InCommon joins eduGAIN, it is necessary for research 
projects to join national identity federations one-by-one for international interoperability 
or even worse, to coordinate directly with international identity providers one-by-one. 
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For international support of X.509 certificate authentication, the International Grid Trust 
Federation (http://igtf.net/) provides a community of certification authorities serving 
academic researchers. CILogon participates in the IGTF, and the CILogon certification 
authorities are included in the IGTF trust anchor distribution.  
Additionally, identity providers around the world are adopting the standard OAuth 
interface supported by CILogon, primarily for integration with Globus Nexus 
(https://www.globusonline.org/). Examples include University of Exeter (UK), European 
Grid Infrastructure, and University of Canterbury (New Zealand). DataONE could integrate 
directly with these additional OAuth providers (besides CILogon) and/or integrate with 
Globus Nexus for support for these additional providers as they come online. 
In summary, providing support for international users beyond the existing Google ID 
support poses significant technical challenges. Work in progress by InCommon, Globus, 
IGTF, and others has the potential to address these challenges in the future. DataONE could 
actively engage with these leading-edge efforts (potentially in collaboration with CTSC), or 
DataONE could monitor this ongoing work and wait until more complete solutions are 
available (for example, when InCommon joins eduGAIN). 
4.2.2.4  Managing Groups 
The DataONE IdM system provides a very basic user group capability, with an unmanaged 
namespace and no method for transferring group ownership. To support user groups 
appearing in long-lived data access control policies, the CTSC reviewers recommend 
globally unique group names and improved group management capabilities (including 
transfer of ownership and multiple owners of a group). 
4.2.2.5 Browser Authentication for Member Nodes 
DataONE’s design for user browser-based authentication to member nodes is unclear. The 
current DataONE design supports certificate-based authentication, but certificates in 
browsers are notoriously difficult to manage. The possibility of a web single sign-on 
mechanism (OpenID, SAML, etc.) between the CNs and MNs was discussed during the 
review and requires further design work. 
4.2.3  Operational Issues 
Operational security is an important part of total system security.  As noted in the 
Strengths section, DataONE has many good operational mechanisms in place; however, a 
few operational issues were found while reviewing the overall system. 
4.2.3.1  Incident Response Plan 
DataONE currently lacks an incident response plan that describes when and how 
Coordinating and Member Nodes communicate during a security incident. 
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4.2.3.2  Backup of IdM Data 
DataONE’s user and group data is not being backed up at the CNs, though it is replicated 
across the CNs. As this data potentially includes personally identifying information, any 
future plans for backing up this information should include appropriate safeguards (e.g., 
encryption of backups).  The DataONE disaster recovery plan should address IdM data 
including recovery of identity bindings and group memberships that are relied upon in 
long-lived data access control policies. 
4.2.3.3  Logging 
DataONE currently uses decentralized system logging that may not include complete 
logging of identity mappings and group memberships (such as when 
mappings/memberships were added/removed and by whom). CTSC recommends 
centralized log collection to assist with incident response and disaster recovery. 
4.2.3.4  Intrusion Detection 
At the time of the assessment there is a lack of intrusion detection done at the Coordinating 
Nodes (CNs), but that is being addressed. The user and group information managed by the 
CNs is critical for appropriate access control and should be appropriately monitored for 
intrusions using network- and host-based intrusion detection. 
4.2.3.5  Contacting Users 
Currently DataONE users are not required to provide contact information upon 
registration, and the user email addresses provided by CILogon are not recorded by 
DataONE. While it is laudable for DataONE to avoid unnecessary collection of personal 
information, having user contact information is valuable for incident response and support 
purposes. The CTSC reviewers recommend that DataONE consider requiring collection of 
user email addresses for these purposes. 
4.2.3.6  Dependency on CILogon 
CTSC notes that the DataONE IdM system is highly dependent on CILogon. A major natural 
disaster impacting the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign or a major funding or 
personnel change impacting the CILogon project could have major negative impact on 
DataONE. In collaboration with DataONE and XSEDE, the CILogon project is pursuing 
geographic redundancy for the CILogon service for fail-over and disaster recovery, with the 
National Institute for Computational Sciences (NICS) at the University of Tennessee as a 
potential backup hosting site. The NSF XSEDE project and DOE grant DE-SC0008597 
support CILogon operations at the University of Illinois through 2015. CTSC reviewers 
recommend that DataONE consider establishing a service level agreement with CILogon 
(possibly through XSEDE) for long-term support. CILogon uses open source software, so 
the possibility exists that DataONE could operate a CILogon service of its own in case the 
CILogon project at Illinois is unable to meet DataONE’s needs. Alternatives to CILogon such 
as Globus Nexus could also be considered. 
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5  Recommendations 
The CTSC reviewers make the following recommendations to DataONE regarding its IdM 
system. The recommendations are grouped into short (less than a couple weeks), medium 
(less than a couple months) and longer-term tasks. Within each group, tasks are prioritized 
into high, medium and low priority. We also include a set of recommendations on issues to 
monitor for potential problems. 
 
5.1  Short-Term Recommended Tasks 
 (R1)(HIGH) Clarify “Verified User” as described in 4.2.1.4. The term “verified user” is 
not clearly defined in the documentation.  This definition should also include use 
cases showing how a user becomes verified.  Architectural design and API 
information should be included. 
5.2  Medium-Term Recommended Tasks 
 (R2)(HIGH) Complete system design: Section 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.5 describe gaps in the 
current IdM system design that should be rectified. 
 (R3)(HIGH) Complete documentation regarding policies and expectations between 
Coordinating Nodes, Member Nodes and DataONE users as described in 4.2.1.2. A 
more complete description of the roles and trust agreements between the 
Coordinating and Member Nodes and the users should be included. This description 
should detail which Node does what with regard to access, authorization and the 
management of the user’s identity, along with how identity mappings are 
maintained, created and used. Policies and procedures that DataONE needs to 
develop include:  
o Member Node Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), i.e., DataONE’s 
expectations for MN security practices 
o Privacy Policy, i.e., how DataONE manages user data 
o Acceptable Use Policy, i.e., expectations of user behavior 
 (R4)(MEDIUM) Author incident response policies and procedures to address 4.2.3.1. 
As noted in the “Documentation” section, an incident response plan should be 
developed. This plan should cover incidents such as inappropriate content being 
uploaded and stored on systems.  Member Nodes need to know their 
responsibilities in monitoring and reporting malicious activities.  The mechanism 
for reporting these activities should also be covered in the plan.  If an incident 
occurs on one of the Coordinating Nodes, this needs to be communicated to the 
Member Nodes and users.  The lack of a clearly defined response plan is a risk to the 
current system. 
See Appendix D for additional guidance on developing incident response plans. 
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 (R5)(MEDIUM) Logging of identity mappings as described in 4.2.3.3.  Review of the 
audit logs should be performed. Verify that good information is being logged when it 
comes to identity mappings and group membership.  Verify that information on 
when and by whom these mappings were created is captured. 
 (R6)(LOW) Complete and update documentation as described in 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.4. 
Updates should be made to documentation to remove all sections that are marked 
“TODO”.   These “TODO” sections should be filled-in with current information or 
moved to their own section in the design addressing future work. The documents 
should also be reviewed by the DataONE team, and updated and corrected with 
current information and designs. In the event a Member Node wants to implement 
its own identity-handling or access control software, it will be useful to have a full 
description of the XML extension included by CILogon.  This description should 
include a schema specification and detailed information on each section and 
element of the XML document. 
5.3  Longer-Term Recommended Tasks 
 (R7)(MEDIUM) Deploy an intrusion detection system for the Coordinating Nodes 
per 4.2.3.4.  Currently, there is no intrusion detection system in place.  Intrusion 
detection should also be part of the overall incident response plan, including the 
steps to be taken in response to a detected intrusion. See Appendix B for additional 
guidance on intrusion detection. 
 (R8)(MEDIUM) Develop a contingency plan for CILogon per 4.2.3.6. Possible options 
include establishing a replica of CILogon for both redundancy and to bring expertise 
in-house or exploring the use of Globus Online/Nexus. 
 (R9)(MEDIUM) Backup IdM data as described in 4.2.3.2.  Perform encrypted 
backups of user and group data from the identity management system for disaster 
recovery. 
 (R10)(LOW) Centralized logging as described in 4.2.3.3.  Centralized auditing might 
be considered to help with monitoring the system. See Appendix C for guidance on 
centralized logging. 
 (R11)(LOW) Track efforts in international identity federation and privacy issues as 
described in 4.2.2.3. 
5.4  Issues to be Tracked 
CTSC noted the following attributes of the DataONE IdM system which do not obviously 
need remediation, but should be monitored closely by the DataONE team. 
 (R12) Lack of DataONE-internal user identifiers (4.2.2.1). 
 (R13) Lack of user contact information (4.2.3.5).  
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Appendix A: DataONE/CTSC Engagement Process 
 
At the request of DataONE (http://www.dataone.org/) CTSC was asked to perform an 
architectural review of DataONE’s current Identity Management System (IdM).  CTSC 
agreed upon the following goals of the review with DataONE: 
 Identify the specific software components to be reviewed.  
 Identify (or assist in creating) documentation of those components sufficient to 
review them. 
 Perform and document an assessment of those components that is of use to 
DataONE. 
 Assess potential vulnerabilities, scalability, interoperability and supportability 
The focus of the review was on identity management for DataONE’s data infrastructure. 
This includes Member Nodes, Coordinating Nodes, CILogon, certificate management, and 
identity mapping. The DataONE Identity API and Authorization API are the focus. Other off-
the-shelf components such as LDAP are less of a concern and therefore not the focus of the 
review. Furthermore, the DataONE project internal IDM system for project collaboration is 
out of scope. 
The following plan was developed for the review: 
1. Discuss with members of the DataONE team to understand both the DataONE IdM 
system and its role in the overall DataONE system. 
2. Identify the specific scope of the DataONE IdM system to be assessed. 
3. Work to identify documents related to the DataONE IdM system. 
4. Work to document any portions of the DataONE IdM system that are missing, 
incomplete, or lack sufficient detail for assessment. The onus for creating such 
documentation lies with DataONE, though CTSC can help. 
5. CTSC will then undertake an assessment of the system, with DataONE staff being 
available to answer questions and provide additional details if needed. 
6. CTSC will document their assessment and deliver an initial draft to DataONE. 
The review process ended up taking the form of a 2 day series of face-to-face meetings 
between the CTSC and DataONE teams.  These meetings were held in an informal ad-hoc 
style.  Prior to the face-to-face meetings, the CTSC team reviewed documents identified by 
DataONE as being valuable to understanding the IdM system. After reviewing the 
documents a basic system characterization was developed.  The review of these documents 
has been included in this report. 
During the face-to-face meetings, DataONE engineers presented their design and use cases 
for the IdM system.  Through this presentation CTSC personnel were able to ask questions 
and gather information needed to understand the system as it currently exists and plans 
for enhancements.  Prior to the end of the first day of meetings, a summary of findings and 
issues was presented by CTSC.  Based on those findings and questions from DataONE, the 
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schedule for the next day’s meeting was determined.  The second day meeting consisted of 
CTSC staff presenting suggested architectural changes to the current IdM and this 
prompted more information being revealed by the DataONE staff.  During this second day 
several important issues were identified. 
The results of the document review and 2 days of meetings are presented in this report. 
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Appendix B: Intrusion Detection 
Available open source intrusion detection systems include: 
All Inclusive Security-onion (http://code.google.com/p/security-onion/) 
Host Based OSSEC (http://www.ossec.net/) 
Samhain (http://la-samhna.de/samhain/) 
Tripwire (http://sourceforge.net/projects/tripwire/) 
Network Based Snort (http://snort.org/) 
Suricata (http://suricata-ids.org/) 
Bro (http://bro-ids.org/) 
 
Security Onion 
Security-onion (SO) is a very useful package of open source tools to help with network 
security monitoring.  SO provides three core functions: full packet capture, network and 
host-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS and HIDS), and analysis tools.  This provides 
visibility into network traffic and adds context around alerts and anomalous events.  It's 
based on Ubuntu and contains Snort, Suricata, Sguil, Squert, Snorby, Bro, NetworkMiner, 
Xplico, and many other security tools. 
Since SO works off of full-packet capture, disk space can become an issue.  SO allows for 
some tuning of this capture.  For example, you can ignore things like your backup server 
but for the most part all packets are being captured all of the time.  SO does perform some 
disk management for you.  When the data reaches 90% of disk space, SO begins to purge 
out the captured packets and log files that it has been saving and using.  With this in mind, 
adequate sizing should be used when setting the system up. 
Currently, SO is only offered on Ubuntu.  SO is released as an ISO and can be easily installed 
as a VM.  This is the recommended installation practice too.  Analysts are encouraged to 
install SO as a VM running on their workstation. 
While automation and correlation can enhance intelligence and assist in the process of 
sorting through false positives and malicious indicators, there is no replacement for human 
intelligence and awareness.  SO only provides the tools; the administrators must actually 
monitor what is going on.  You cannot install the system and walk away thinking things are 
safe. 
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Appendix C: Centralized Logging 
 
Centralized logging aggregates in a central location multiple log files from multiple of 
servers, which is very helpful in comparing logs across systems when investigating security 
incidents. Logging to dedicated log collector servers also provides redundancy in the case 
local system logs may have been manipulated by an attacker. 
Security Onion provides the ELSA centralized syslog framework 
(https://code.google.com/p/enterprise-log-search-and-archive/), which supports log 
queries, alerts and dashboards. 
Examples for setting up centralized logging using syslog-ng can be found at the following: 
 http://www.balabit.com/sites/default/files/documents/syslog-ng-ose-3.3-
guides/en/syslog-ng-ose-v3.3-guide-admin-en/html/syslog-ng.conf.5.html 
 http://www.deer-run.com/~hal/sysadmin/SSH-SyslogNG.html 
 http://www.enterprisenetworkingplanet.com/netsysm/article.php/3596656/Build
-a-Secure-Logging-Server-with-syslogng.htm 
 http://www.enterprisenetworkingplanet.com/netsysm/article.php/3598146/Build
-a-Secure-Logging-Server-with-syslogng-Part-2.htm 
Examples for setting up centralized logging using rsyslog can be found at: 
 http://www.rsyslog.com/receiving-messages-from-a-remote-system/ 
 http://www.rsyslog.com/sending-messages-to-a-remote-syslog-server/ 
For systems that are logging information via Log4j, SyslogAppender can be used.  Good 
examples for configuring and running with this setup can be found at: 
 http://kazed.blogspot.com/2009/12/using-syslog-appender-in-log4j.html 
 http://blog.trifork.com/2010/01/14/logging-to-the-syslog-from-a-java-
application/ 
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Appendix D: Incident Response 
 
The Open Science Grid wiki provides a good example of an incident response process 
tailored to distributed cyberinfrastructure, along with additional incident response 
references: 
 https://twiki.grid.iu.edu/bin/view/Security/IncidentResponseProcess 
 https://twiki.grid.iu.edu/bin/view/Security/IncidentResponseReferences 
Another potentially useful reference when developing an incident response plan for a 
federated system is the CIC Federated Security Incident Response Policy, which has been 
adopted as an InCommon recommended practice: 
 http://www.cic.net/Libraries/Technology/Federated_Security_Incident_Response.sflb.ashx 
 https://spaces.internet2.edu/x/8o6KAQ 
Lastly, the technical report “An Analysis of the Benefits and Risks to LIGO When 
Participating in Identity Federations” provides an example risk assessment that can be a 
useful input when preparing incident response plans: 
 https://dcc.ligo.org/public/0070/G1100964/002/LIGOIdentityFederationRiskAnalysis.pdf 
 
